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Jacquette on Grelling’s Paradox
JEFFREY KETLAND
Dale Jacquette (Jacquette 2004) argues that, despite usual arguments to
the contrary, a version of Grelling’s paradox reappears in type theory,
and thus that type theory, or higher-order logic, is inconsistent:
I maintain in what follows that type theory, although it appears tai-
lor-made to solve the problem, does not actually forestall Grelling’s
paradox, but that the paradox remains derivable in spite of rigor-
ously enforced type restrictions. (Jacquette 2004: 251)
Jacquette’s argument is based on the following ‘definitions’:
(1) ∀Fn+1∀Fn(Hn+1(Fn) ↔ ~Fn+1(Fn))
(2) ∀Fn∀Fn−1(Hn(Fn−1) ↔ ~Fn(Fn−1)).
Definition (1) is meant to define a type n+1 heterologicality relation
Hn+1 such that, for any type n+1 relation Fn+1 and type n relation Fn,
Hn+1 applies to Fn just in case Fn+1 does not apply to Fn. Definition (2) is
meant to define a type n heterologicality relation Hn such that, for any
type n relation Fn and type n−1 relation Fn−1, Hn applies to Fn−1 just in case
Fn does not apply to Fn−1.
The argument proceeds by instantiating the second quantifier in (1)
with ‘Hn’, thus,
(3) ∀Fn+1(Hn+1(Hn) ↔ ~Fn+1(Hn)).
Next, instantiate the variable ‘Fn+1’ with ‘Hn+1’, giving the contradic-
tion,
(4) Hn+1(Hn) ↔ ~Hn+1(Hn).
To see what is wrong with Jacquette’s argument, reconsider the ‘defi-
nition’ (1). In writing the argument dependency (i.e. the free variables
which occur) of the definiendum ‘Hn+1’ as ‘Hn+1(Fn)’, Jacquette wishes to
represent Hn+1 as a one-place relation. But the definiens is ‘~Fn+1(Fn)’ and
thus contains two distinct free variables, ‘Fn+1’ and ‘Fn’. So, Hn+1 must be
a two-place relation. That is, the definition (1) is meant to fix Hn+1 as
applying to a pair (Fn+1, Fn) just in case Fn+1 does not apply to Fn. The free
variables should thus be written ‘Hn+1(Fn+1, Fn)’. So, correctly expressed,
definition (1) should read,
(5) ∀Fn+1∀Fn(Hn+1(Fn+1, Fn) ↔ ~Fn+1(Fn)).
But the argument dependency ‘Hn+1(Fn+1, Fn)’ is not type-theoretically
acceptable. For the order of any defined relation must be higher than the
orders of its arguments.
To make the definition type-theoretically acceptable, we might write
instead,
 (6) ∀Fn+1∀Fn(Hn+2(Fn+1, Fn) ↔ ~Fn+1(Fn)).
This is a type-theoretically acceptable definition. But this does not lead
to contradiction (at least, not obviously). For Hn+2 is, by assumption, a
type n+2 relation and thus lies outside the range of the initial quantifiers.
Furthermore, Fn+1 is required to be a one-place relation, while Hn+2 is a
two-place relation. It would be a category mistake to instantiate a variable
for one-place relations with (a constant for) a two-place relation.
In short, what is wrong with Jacquette’s argument is that (according to
his own intentions) the defined heterologicality relation Hn+1 is a two-
place relation, with arguments Fn+1 and Fn. When this is clarified, the
proposed definition (i.e. (5) above) violates type-restrictions.
The mistake here illustrates nicely a phenomenon in the theory of defi-
nitions, namely that the formulation of definitions must satisfy certain
formal constraints. One of these constraints is that any free variable that
appears in the definiens must also appear in the definiendum.1 Jacquette’s
‘definition’ (1) violates this constraint.
Violating these constraints can lead to an amusing ‘proof’ that Peano
arithmetic (indeed, any theory which proves that there are least two ob-
jects) is inconsistent. For example, assume the Peano axioms for arithme-
tic, and define a predicate ‘P’ as follows:
(7) ∀x∀y(P(x) ↔ x < y).
From (7), we can infer,
 (8) ∀y(P(1) ↔ 1 < y).
Thus,
(9) P(1) ↔ 1 < 2.
And thus, since ‘1 < 2’ is provable,
(10) P(1).
But also, from (7), we may infer,
(11) P(1) ↔ 1 < 0.
And thus, since ‘1 < 0’ is refutable,
(12) ~P(1).
1 See Haack 1978: 103–4 for a short discussion of these constraints in relation to
Tarski’s definition of truth.
Does this remarkably simple argument show that arithmetic is incon-
sistent? No, it merely shows that ‘definitions’ like (7), and, similarly, Jac-
quette’s (1), violate the aforementioned formal constraint.
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